

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/10/07 : CIA-RDP87-00812R000200080007-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED]

STAT

[REDACTED] does not believe there is a need for a pre-SECOM meeting. She has highlighted a couple of items in the attached which you should focus on before the meeting.

STAT



STAT

Date 4/30/85

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

283rd SECOM Meeting

FRC NO. 25X1

DATE 30 April 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE
RECEIVED FORWARDER

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1. D/S 30 APR 1985 Attached is the package for the 1 May 1985 SECOM meeting.

2. Two action items for D/S, highlighted in yellow, are:

° Two nominees for the Personal Security course to be submitted by 1 May.

° Possibility of issuing a Notice to staff employees and retirees regarding the [redacted]

[redacted]

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1. [redacted]

2. [redacted]

3. [redacted]

4. [redacted]

5. [redacted]

6. [redacted]

7. [redacted]

8. [redacted]

9. [redacted]

10. [redacted]

11. [redacted]

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

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Two-Hundred and Eighty-third Meeting

Wednesday, 1 May 1985

Room 7D32, CIA Headquarters

CONFIDENTIAL

Appendix

CONFIDENTIAL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

*SECOM-A-274

19 April 1985

AGENDA

Two Hundred and Eighty-third Meeting
Wednesday, 1 May 1985, 10:00 a.m.
Room 7D32, CIA Headquarters

Special Briefing by Charles Allen, NIO for Terrorism, on security aspects
of the terrorist threat

Preliminary Comments (e.g., [redacted] position; Project Slammer;
leak matters; personal security course; hearings and briefings)

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ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes of 3 April meeting

ITEM 2 New Business

ITEM 3 Next Meeting - 10:00 a.m., Wednesday 29 May 1985, room 7D32, CIA
Headquarters

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Comment

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AGENDA COMMENTS

SPECIAL BRIEFING By Charles Allen, NIO for Terrorism.

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS On 25 April, [redacted] advised that the following comments would probably be addressed at the beginning of the SECOM meeting:

LEAK MATTERS The Gunman leak will be discussed and the fact that it will be referred to the Department of Justice through the Office of General Counsel.

SECOM STAFF The new SECOM Staff Member from the FBI, Gary Stoops, will be introduced. Members will be notified that [redacted] contract will soon run out. There is still no replacement for [redacted] and SECOM may have to cancel the Adjudicator's Seminar.

PROJECT SLAMMER The Working Group will begin meetings on Monday and Tuesday, 29 and 30 April. C/SECOM will report on the status of those deliberations. Members on the working group include Dr. Hibler; Special Agent Richard Alt, FBI; [redacted] Dr. McCarroll, Walter Reed Army Hospital; [redacted] ORD/CIA; [redacted] NSA; Dr. Hyland, NIS; Dr. Bloom, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center; Martin Hirschowitz, DOE; Calvin Wood, Department of Justice; [redacted] DIA. Special Agent Roseanne Russell, FBI; [redacted] Major Dawn Zelo, Army Intelligence, Fort Meade; and [redacted]

Jerry Rubino, DOJ, has provided a computer print out of the names and places of incarceration for those individuals suggested for the Project Slammer study to the working group.

SECOM BUDGET ITEMS Those items that were approved at the last SECOM meeting for inclusion in SECOM budgeting have been submitted to the IC Staff for concurrence.

SECOM EXECUTIVE SEMINAR

PFIAB Briefing The members will be told about the briefing C/SECOM and [redacted] gave to PFIAB staffers on TSCS and that the PFIAB members will next be briefed on this topic. C/SECOM report on that briefing is attached as Tab A.

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PERSONAL SECURITY COURSE Members are beginning to show some interest in the course since a sample "hands on" session has been offered to members by [redacted]

[redacted] Members have been asked to select a primary and a secondary candidate for the 4 May (Saturday) session. (attached as Tab B) Deadline is 1 May for SECOM.

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4C PROGRAM As a follow on to the last SECOM meeting, C/SSC and the 4C Program managers met with representatives of the DOD 4C users in the Pentagon on 24 April. The meeting provided a useful forum for the exchange of ideas and allowed the users to become aware of improvements and new procedures. [redacted] representative indicated that any problems they had have now been solved. All agreed to meet periodically in the future.

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ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes of 3 April 1985 meeting.

ACTION TAKEN RE THE MINUTES

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE FUTURE Nominee submitted to SECOM.

EXTRACT FROM AF SCI SECURITY ADVISOR --The document and OS's response are attached as Tab C.

ITEM 2 New Business

AIR FORCE CABLE ON LEAKS--ATTACHED AS Tab D is a copy of a message sent by the Air Force member to the Special Security Officers of his department concerning the [redacted] request for information. SAG had also received a copy and has inquired, through PPG, if D/S wishes to issue such a notice to staff employees and retirees as indicated in SECOM's suggestion. Also attached is the cable that was issued to contractors on this Subject and was coordinated by OCC. As you may recall, [redacted]

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ITEM 3 NEXT MEETING -10:00 AM Wednesday 29 May room 7D32 Headquarters.

OTHER SECOM MATTERS: Attached is correspondence between the DCI, Director of OPM and Mr. Weinberger regarding the Federal Personnel Program. C/SECOM's response to the DCI on this topic is also attached for your information. C/SECOM advised the DCI

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that there is no reason for CIA to get involved in the dispute between DoD and OPM. PPG provided the same direction, verbally, to the DDA staff for the DCI on Thursday, 25 April for his Friday meeting with Mr. Weinberger. All documents on this subject are attached as TAB E.

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A

Date

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL S.

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. <u>DD/PAM</u>	<u>S</u>	<u>4/18</u>
2. <u></u>		
3. <u>C/PPG</u>	<u>nhv</u>	<u>4/22</u>
4. <u>C/POLICY</u>	<u>JR</u>	<u>4/23/85</u>
5. <u></u>		
File		Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

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**DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals,
clearances, and similar actions**

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
 Prescribed by GSA
 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

* GPO: 1983 O - 381-529 (232)

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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

* SECOM-D-115
16 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM:

Chairman

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SUBJECT:

PFIAB Staff Meeting on TSCM

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1. On 11 April 1985, [REDACTED] Chairman of SECOM's Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSCS), [REDACTED] Executive Secretary, TSCS, and I briefed Dan Carlin and Randy Ford of the PFIAB Staff on technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) in the Intelligence Community.

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4. The "low profile" of the TSCS was explained by pointing out that all agencies with TSCM capabilities participate in the subcommittee's activities and that the indiscriminate dissemination of technical data on finds is likely to be counterproductive. The TSCM organizations are kept informed and are provided guidance on countermeasures. [REDACTED] provided several samples of TSCS technical publications for review by the PFIAB staff members.

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8. The meeting seemed to be mutually beneficial and lasted approximately two hours.

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cc: C/TSCS
~~D/OS/CIA~~

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CONFIDENTIAL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-129

19 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:

[redacted]
Chairman

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SUBJECT: Personal Security Course

1. At the 3 April meeting of SECOM, [redacted] briefed the members on their program of training personnel in how to respond to and deal with terrorist attacks and street crime. They invited SECOM members to send qualified personnel to be trained to present similar programs in their respective organizations and to assist in the multi-agency workload faced by the three-man team.

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2. [redacted] advised that the team is willing to present a "hands-on" (literally) session for SECOM members or their designees from 0900 to 1700, 4 May 1985. Since the optimum number of trainees is 20, and some members probably will not participate, you are invited to nominate a primary and a secondary candidate for this session. Please let me know by 1 May 1985, in order to complete arrangements.

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[redacted]
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C

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Extract from AF SCI Security Advisory

FROM		EXTENSION	NO.
			DATE 18 April 1985
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)		DATE	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED		OFFICER'S INITIALS	
1. C/Policy Branch		4/27/85 JR	Attached is response to SECOM tasking regarding subject.
2.			
3. C/PPG	4/27/85	mhu	
4.			
5. DD/P&M	4/22	4/22	
6.			
7. DD/S			
8.			
9. D/S	22 APR 1985	22 APR 1985 K	
10. APG			
11.			
12.			
13.			
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22 APR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM: [REDACTED] STAT
SECOM Member

SUBJECT: Extract from AF SCI Security Advisory

REFERENCE: A. SECOM document dated 27 March 1985, Same Subject
B. SECOM-M-287, dated 4 April 1985, Same Subject

1. This memorandum is in response to Chairman, SECOM's request to review referenced subject and advise the Security Committee if it, or part of it, should be made Community Policy.

2. The thrust of the statement contains a valid suggestion and should be endorsed as community policy. However, it is suggested that the wording be changed to read, "The appearance in the media of classified intelligence information does not constitute declassification. Persons who, because of their former or current briefed status, are aware of the accuracy of such unauthorized disclosures must not lend them credence by using them in any public medium. The mere acknowledgment of the person's military title..."

[REDACTED] STAT

!OS/P&M/PPG [REDACTED] (18 Apr 85):

STAT

!Retyped 22 Apr 85:

!Distribution:!

! Orig - Adse!

! 1 - D/S Chrono!

! (1) - PPG Chrono!

! 1 - OS Registry!

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FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-126
18 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM: [redacted]

STAT

Chairman

SUBJECT: Avoiding Unauthorized Disclosures

1. Attached is a copy of a message the Air Force member sent Special Security Officers of his department concerning unauthorized disclosures. The security education advice provided by [redacted] is applicable to the Intelligence Community as a whole. The type of solicitation involved could well appear in a variety of other journals.

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2. Members are requested to consider issuing similar reminders to cleared personnel of their organizations, and, where the means exist through retiree associations, to former personnel. The recipients of such reminders should be cautioned against any discussion of subjects that they dealt with on a classified basis, and advised of their continuing obligations to submit for prepublication review any written material concerning SCI which they contemplate publishing or providing journalists, scholars or any uncleared persons. Members are also requested to advise the SECOM staff of other instances coming to their attention in which magazines contain solicitations for information on past or present intelligence activities.

[redacted]
STAT

Attachment:
AFSSO/INS message 151255Z APR 85

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UNCLASSIFIEDC/SECOM
INCOMING

/46/

FRP:

NON-AGENCY

ACTION: NONE INFO: RF, FILE, CSFILE, C/SECOM, DDO/SCO, MPB/GG,
 SECUR/SSC-3, (B/W)

85 7023217 NUR PAGE 001
 TOR: 151600Z APR 85

RR [REDACTED] #2293 1051433
 DE [REDACTED]

ZNY MMNISH
 ZKZK RR XAA DE
 R 151255Z APR 85
 FM AFSSO USAF //INS//
 TO ROXAD
 ZEM
 UNCLAS

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Q000
 FOR SSO OR EQUIVALENT AT EACH LOCATION - KEEP AND PASS/ADVISE ALL
 AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS/ACTIVITIES/ELEMENTS YOU SUPPORT AS SHOWN IN
 THE DIA COMPARTMENTED ADDRESS BOOK OR USSID 505; JOINT SERVICE SSO'S
 HOLD OR PASS TO RESPECTIVE AF ELEMENT AS APPROPRIATE; ADDITIONAL
 PASSING INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 6920ESG PASS TO 6920ESG/SP, DET
 422 AND 2114CS; 6931ESS FOR 6931ESS/SP; AFSSO AFCC KEEP AND PASS TO
 CSS; 6912ESG FOR 6912ESG/SPA; SSO DMAAC KEEP AND PASS TO DET 1 1974
 CG: SSO SAC KEEP AND PASS TO DSIATP/SVA; SSO MCCHORD KEEP AND PASS
 TO 25AD/DOI; COMFAIRKEF PASS TO AFI/DOI; SSO 15AF HOLD AND PASS TO
 AFISC/IGTI AND 26AD/DOI; USSOUTHCOM KEEP AND PASS TO 24COMPWG/DOI;
 ESC/IN KEEP AND PASS TO ATC/TTOI - ATC HOLD FOR AFMPC/ROS4E; SSO
 ADCOM KEEP AND PASS TO AFAITC/SVA; CIA PASS TO CHAIRMAN, SECOM;
 DIRNSA PASS TO DOD COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER/C4 (LT COL CRAIG); AFSSO
 RADCOM KEEP AND PASS TO 21AD/DOI; AFSSO FTD KEEP AND PASS TO AFLC/INS
 SUBJ: JEFFREY RICHELSON REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (ROXAD 22-85)

REF: AFSSO USAF/INS 271312Z MAR 85, ROXAD 17-85
 1. REF ADVISED OF A RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK BY JEFFREY RICHELSON
 TITLED "US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY." THE MARCH 85 EDITION OF AIR
 FORCE MAGAZINE (PG 21) CONTAINS A LETTER BY RICHELSON SOLICITING
 INFORMATION ON US INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST
 THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN 1945-60. RICHELSON IS "INTERESTED IN HEAR-
 ING FROM ANYONE INVOLVED IN AIRBORNE PERIPHERAL PHOTOGRAPHIC OR ELEC-
 TRONIC RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS DURING THESE YEARS AS WELL AS FROM
 ANYONE INVOLVED IN COLLECTION OPERATIONS CONCERNING SOVIET NUCLEAR
 TESTING." THIS SOLICITATION MAY APPEAR IN OTHER PERIODICALS.
 2. WHILE WE DO NOT DISCOURAGE ACADEMIC RESEARCH, SUCH SOLICITATIONS
 MAY BE A VEHICLE FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES. INFORMATION FROM THE
 PERIOD CITED ABOVE MAY STILL BE CLASSIFIED OR BE SUBJECT TO DOD/AF
 SECURITY REVIEW PRIOR TO RELEASE. INDIVIDUALS WHO RESPOND TO SUCH
 SOLICITATIONS LEAVE THEMSELVES OPEN TO EXPANDED QUESTIONING BY THE
 INTERVIEWER. QUESTIONING WHICH MAY GO BEYOND THE INITIAL SCOPE OF THE
 INQUIRY INTO SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. IT MAY ALSO BE A
 MEANS FOR AN INTERVIEWER/RESEARCHER TO CONFIRM INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY
 OBTAINED FROM OTHER SOURCES. IN SHORT, PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN
 INVOLVED IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ARE CAUTIONED REGARDING THE
 IMPLICATIONS OF SOLICITATIONS SUCH AS THAT OUTLINED ABOVE. EXPER-
 ENCE SHOWS THESE HAVE BECOME A CONDUIT FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.
 3. WE ASK THAT YOU CIRCULATE THIS GUIDANCE TO CURRENTLY CLEARED
 PERSONNEL, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS, AND TO LOCAL SERVICE ORGANIZA-
 TIONS WHICH MAY HAVE RETIRED MILITARY/CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO WERE
 INVOLVED IN US INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS EITHER AS A PARTICIPANT OR
 USER OF INTELLIGENCE. WE VIEW THIS PRIMARILY AS "IN-HOUSE" EDUCA-
 TION EFFORT AT THIS TIME. YOUR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT IS
 APPRECIATED.

UNCLASSIFIED

END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

Date

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

17 Apr 75

To: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. GPOs/PSI	D	17 APR 1985
2. DDC/PSI		17 APR 1985
3. DDC/P+M	D	4/17
4. CISAG		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

I have sent copies to George Hauder, C/PAO.
and [redacted] OGC (Publications Review Board).

This info should be disseminated by either

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5041-102

★ GPO : 1983 O - 381-529 (301)

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)

Prescribed by GSA

FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
1. <u>A C / LIB</u>			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
Action	File	Note and Return	
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation	
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply	
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me	
Comment	Investigate	Signature	
Coordination	Justify		

REMARKS

- a.) Find out if SECAM is doing anything about a ~~coordinating~~ notice or whatever. IF not
- b.) Determine the system for Agency wide notices and prepare a memo under [redacted] signature the appropriate chain [redacted]
- c.) As cover genrally retires (GMD), should be notified too by a mailer. This might be requested in same memo for (b) above
- DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

STAT

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
[redacted]	
	Phone No.
5	

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

STAT

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP		Date	
		21 Feb 1985	
TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
L ADD/S&T 6E-56 Headquarters			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			
Action		File	Note and Return
Approval		For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested		For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate		For Your Information	See Me
Comment		Investigate	Signature
Coordination		Justify	

REMARKS

[Redacted]

STAT

I thought you would be interested in
seeing the wire sent to contractors pursuant
to your suggestion in DDS&T-083-85 (attached).

[Redacted]

STAT

Atts

**DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, dispositions,
clearances, and similar actions**

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
Director of Security	[Redacted]
	[Redacted]

Prescribed by OSA
PPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

* GPO : 1983 O - 381-529 (301)

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Distribution:
Orig - Adse
1 - OS Registry

Page Denied

DDS&T-083-85

1 February 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

FROM: James V. Hirsch
Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Leaks of Classified Information

1. It seems to me that we in government unwittingly aid one of the major sources of leaks of classified information we suffer from today. The source I refer to is the group of self-proclaimed intelligence pundits associated with specialized study centers or institutes. These individuals openly publish or discuss details of our collection sources and analysis results. The ones who can do the most damage are those who have had prior legitimate access to classified information. This inside knowledge is often used to pick selectively from the media that information that is very close to the truth for use in public unclassified papers or discussions. In this way erroneous data are gradually sifted out of these analysts' treatment a given classified issue. Some of these analysts have been careful to identify prior open sources for their specific studies. I know of one case of a strategic analyst, a foreigner, who managed to associate himself with U.S. think-tanks and, by insinuation of SCI access, managed to elicit classified information in his discussions. Recently, a subpanel on technical collection of intelligence of an unclassified symposium on strategic issues advertised the participation of an individual who used to work with one of our contractors and who held a number of our SCI clearances.

2. The currency of this particular source of intelligence leakage constantly decays without access to inside information. If we could isolate these sources of leaks from so-called unclassified governmental or government contractor interaction, their effectiveness would be significantly diminished. It doesn't make sense for one part of the government to rail against intelligence leakage while other parts cheerfully participate in open forums with individuals who systematically use such exchanges to confirm or deny classified information already in the public domain. It would seem prudent for us to investigate ways in which we can prevent government and government contractor participation in unclassified conferences when there is a risk that by doing so we could aid in verifying the accuracy of intelligence information appearing in unclassified published materials. We gain little or nothing of substance from many of these exchanges, especially when technical collection of intelligence is the topic. Would it be possible

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SUBJECT: Leaks of Classified Information

for your committee to develop guidelines to limit the participation of Intelligence Community organizations and their contractors in unclassified symposia, conferences or technical meetings dealing with intelligence when such participation could aid in establishing the credibility of known leakers of classified information?

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 James V. Hirsch

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STAT

25 April 1985

FOR:
SECOM Member

STAT

FROM:

STAT

Attached is for your information.